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BACKGROUND 
 
In the 1970s in parts of the Middle East and in the Gulf, (United Arab 
Emirates, Oman and Qatar especially), the burqa or niqab when worn was 
worn by women from tribal regions only. Otherwise known as a “batoola” this 
garment is a head and face covering with an area of mesh covering the eyes, 
another variation is provided by a mask covering the face and nose. Jonathan 
Raban in 1979 observed such sights in London “...it was on the Earl’s Court 
Road that I first saw the strange beak shaped foil masks of Gulf women...”1 
There has been a modernist revival in these once rare face coverings for a 
multiplicity of reasons and correspondingly the wearing of them contain 
several meanings. The burqa is worn for political, religious and other reasons, 
but also although not exclusively it is a garment intended to keep women in 
subjection. Stuart Hall in interpreting the work of Frantz Fanon’s 1960’s 
writings on the burqa (then called the veil) for Algerian women, explained 
“no sign is fixed in its meaning”2 emphasising the fluidity of the burqa and 
also its capacity for appropriation by others. This is also true when 
considering the symbolic significance of the burqa today. Wearing it is 
defended as a right to choose, albeit in parts of Asia, for example in 
Afghanistan in the tribal regions, the burqa is a requirement for women. 
                                                     
∗ BA, MA, LLM, PhD, Professor of Law and Dean of Law, University of 
Buckingham; Barrister. Member of the EWI and Expert Witness in the case of 
D(R), R v [2013] EW Misc 13 (CC). 
1 Jonathan Raban, Arabia (Picador 1979) 11. 
2 Frantz Fanon, Studies in a Dying Colonialism (New York, Monthly Review Press, 
1965). See also Frantz Fanon: Black Skin, White Mask / directed by Isaac Julien, 
(Video Pal Format) 1996; Rita Faulkner, ‘Assia Djebar, Frantz Fanon, Women, Veils, 
and Land’ (1996) 70 World Literature Today, 847. 
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Whilst in some parts of Africa and the Middle East wearing the burqa is 
expressly prohibited. In the West and on the streets of London (following 
recent patterns of migration) the burqa is an increasingly common sight, and 
whilst it might have been worn by a woman who was subject to the norms of 
her own society and merely visiting the United Kingdom, many women who 
choose to settle in the United Kingdom and desire United Kingdom 
nationality are also wearing the burqa. This demonstration and visible 
representation of otherness has created anxiety, provoked public debate and 
criticism, and in France and Belgium, prohibition.  
The arguments against the burqa are several including, amongst others, 
that the burqa is imposed, that it is oppressive and demeaning and contravenes 
gender equality, and that it poses a threat to national security. The argument 
for the freedom to wear the burqa aligns with the obligation to preserve and 
protect multi-culturalism and a belief that dress choice is a fundamental 
human right. Feminists urging gender equality and respect for human rights 
are divided, some regard the burqa as a vile manifestation of brutal patriarchy 
arguing that the pursuit of gender equality trumps any other individual rights 
such that its prohibition is justified. Others contend that whatever the burqa 
may represent the state has no right to interfere with individual rights. The 
majority (fifteen votes to two) judgment, in the case of SAS v France,3 held 
that the objective of “living together” and the overriding need for effective 
social communication rendered the prohibition necessary, and ruled that the 
French prohibition on the burqa in public places fell within the margin of 
appreciation and therefore was not in breach of European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). They declared unanimously, the complaints, 
concerning Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Convention, taken separately and 
together with Article 14 of the Convention, admissible and the remainder of 
the application inadmissible; and held by fifteen votes to two, that there had 
been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention; by fifteen votes to two, that 
there had been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention; unanimously, that 
there had been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together 
with Article 8 or with Article 9 of the Convention; and unanimously, that no 
separate issue arises under Article 10 of the Convention, taken separately or 
together with Article 14 of the Convention. The two dissentient judges, 
Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom, contended that the social objective of 
tolerance within a democratic society protected and of necessity embraced the 
right to wear the burqa irrespective of its intrinsic meaning for the individual 
concerned. 
 
                                                     
3 SAS v France Application no 43835/11 (Unreported, ECHR 1 July 2014) Grand 
Chamber. 
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THE LEGAL BACKGROUND - THE FRENCH LAW 
 
In October 2010, the French Parliament introduced a law, No 2010-1192, 
to “prohibit the act of aiming to conceal the face in public” (Nul ne peut, dans 
l’espace public, porter une tenue destinée à dissimuler son visage). The law 
came into force on 11 April 2011. 
 
“Article 1 – No one shall, in any public space, wear clothing designed 
to conceal the face. Article 2 (I) – For the purposes of the application 
of Section 1, the public space shall be composed of the public 
highway and premises open to the public or used for the provision of a 
public service. (II) – The prohibition set forth in Section 1 herein 
above shall not apply if such clothing is prescribed or authorised by 
legislative or regulatory provisions, is authorised to protect the 
anonymity of the person concerned, is justified for health reasons or 
on professional grounds, or is part of sporting, artistic or traditional 
festivities or events. Article 3 – Failure to comply with the prohibition 
set forth in Section 1 shall be punishable by the fine envisaged for 
offences of the second category. The duty to attend a citizenship 
course as referred to in 8 of Article 131-16 of the Penal Code may be 
ordered at the same time as, or in lieu of, the payment of a fine. 
Article 4 – Whosoever shall, by means of threats, duress or constraint, 
undue influence or misuse of authority, compel another person, by 
reason of the sex of said person, to conceal their face shall be liable to 
a punishment of one year’s imprisonment and a fine of €30,000. When 
the offence is committed against a minor, the punishment shall be 
increased to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of €60,000.” 
 
A similar prohibition was introduced in Belgium. On 28 April 2011, Art 
563 bis of the Belgian Criminal Code established that persons, “Will be 
punished with a fine of 15 to 25 Euro and/or detention of 1 to 7 days, those 
who, except for contrary legal provisions, are present in places that are 
accessible to the public with their faces completely or partially covered or 
hidden, such as not to be recognisable.” 
Women in France who wished to wear the burqa, including those who 
considered the prohibition an affront to personal freedom, protested and 
several women who wished to wear the burqa refused to comply with the law. 
Since the passing of this law, whilst precise figures are difficult to establish, it 
is estimated that over 500 women have been prosecuted across France with 
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some women mounting challenges under the ECHR.4 Hind Ahmas was one 
such litigant, who when stopped by police said she was willing to confirm her 
identity but refused to remove her face veil. She was brought before the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance (Court of First instance for civil and criminal 
matters) and sentenced to a 15 day citizenship course.5 She appealed the 
decision, to the Cour de Cassation in pursuance of exhausting domestic 
remedies (a requirement of Art 35(1) of the ECHR). The Ahmas case (no 12-
808091) was referred to in the judgment of SAS. 
 
“The Court of Cassation was called upon to examine an appeal on 
points of law (no 12-808091) against a judgment of the Community 
Court of Paris, dated 12 December 2011, in which a woman had been 
ordered to follow a two-week citizenship course for wearing the full-
face veil with the aim of protesting against the Law of 11 October 
2010 in the context of a demonstration for that purpose outside the 
Elysée Palace. Examining the arguments submitted by the appellants 
under Article 9 of the Convention, the Criminal Division found as 
follows on 5 March 2013: 
‘..whilst the Community Court was wrong to disregard the religious 
reasons for the impugned demonstration, the judgment should not be 
overruled in so far as, although Article 9 of the Convention ... 
guarantees the exercise of freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, paragraph 2 thereof stipulates that this freedom is subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others; ... this is the case for the Law prohibiting the full 
covering of the face in public places, as it seeks to protect public order 
and safety by requiring everyone who enters a public place to show 
their face; ...’ ”6 
 
 
                                                     
4 See for example, Alison Hird, ‘One Year of France's Burqa Bans Yields 20 Fines 
and No Men Prosecuted’ (RFI, 11 April 2012) 
 <http://www.english.rfi.fr/france/20120411-one-year-frances-burka-ban-yields-20-
fines-and-no-men-prosecuted> accessed 10 August 2014. See also the case of 
Cassandra Belin, AFP, ‘Woman Convicted for Wearing Burqa in France’ (Dawn, 8 
January 2014) <http://www.dawn.com/news/1079182> accessed 10 August 2014> 
5 See Angelique Chrisafis, ‘France’s Burqa Ban: Woman are ‘Effectively under 
House Arrest’’ (The Guardian, 19 September 2011) 
 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/19/battle-for-the-burqa>. 
6 SAS (n 3) [34]. 
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THE CASE FOR SAS BEFORE THE ECtHR 
 
SAS is a 24 year old French citizen originally from Pakistan, and a 
(Sunni) Muslim. She said that she wished to wear the burqa in public. She 
refuted the French Government’s several arguments that the burqa prohibition 
had the legitimate aim of public safety; that for women to cover their faces 
was incompatible with the principle of gender equality; and that women who 
wore the burqa were either forced to do so, or did so in order to proselytise 
others. In contradistinction, she contended that wearing the burqa was instead 
a mark of women’s emancipation, self-assertion and essentially participation 
in society. She submitted that as a devout believer her faith was an essential 
element of her life and asserted that “a truly free society was one which could 
accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, tastes, pursuits, customs and codes of 
conduct, and that it was not for the State to determine the validity of religious 
beliefs.”7 She alleged a violation of Articles 3, 8, 9, 10 and 11, of the ECHR, 
taken separately, and together with Article 14.  
It may be helpful to rehearse the substance of these Articles. Article 3 of 
the Convention, states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” It was, she contended, degrading for her 
to be required to remove the veil in public places and as such that article had 
been or would be violated. She contended a breach of Article 8 which states: 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.” She claimed that her right to religious belief and 
manifestation of that belief under Article 9 had been infringed. “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” Article 10 which 
secured the right to speech asserts. “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority” 
she claimed had also been violated as had Article 11 the right to assembly. 
She argued that wearing the burqa was an aspect of her right to speech and 
that in prohibiting her from wearing a burqa in public she was prevented from 
association with others. Article 14 of the Convention was also violated, she 
contended: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.”  
                                                     
7 Ibid [78]. 
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Her case was considered in public on 27 November 2013, significantly, 
she was represented by United Kingdom lawyers, and six third party 
interveners were joined marking the importance that this case had generated 
within the human rights community across Europe. The Belgian Government 
was the only intervener expressing support for the ban pointing out that a law 
prohibiting the wearing of any “clothing entirely or substantially concealing 
the face” had also been passed in Belgium. The remaining five interveners all 
opposed the ban, albeit presenting slightly different arguments. Amnesty 
International submitted, “In the third party’s submission it is an expression of 
gender-based and religion-based stereotyping to assume that women who 
wear certain forms of dress do so only under coercion; ending discrimination 
would require a far more nuanced approach.”8 ARTICLE 19 submitted that 
the rights protected under the ECHR did not support general prohibitions on 
covering the face in public and expressed the concern that such a ban may 
lead to, “confinement of the women concerned in the home,” and “their 
exclusion from public life and marginalisation” 9 and might “expose Muslim 
women to physical violence and verbal attacks.”10 The Human Rights Centre 
of Ghent University was concerned that such a ban would result in the 
targeting of such woman and to negative stereotyping.11 Liberty also shared 
this concern.12 The Open Society Justice Initiative considered that there was 
no consensus on the issue in Europe and that blanket bans were 
disproportionate.13 
 
Admissibility  
 
Legal argument was heard with regard to whether the claim of SAS was 
admissible (see also Er and Ors v Turkey)14 and (1) whether she had 
exhausted her remedies in the domestic courts under the principle of 
subsidiarity as is required under Art 35(1) (see Varnarva and Others v Turkey, 
15 and (2) whether she was in fact a victim (see Ouardiri v Switzerland and 
Ligue des musulmans de Suisse v Switzerland).16 
                                                     
8 Ibid [91]. 
9 Ibid [92-3]. 
10 Ibid [93]. 
11 Ibid [95]. 
12 Ibid [99]. 
13 Ibid [102]. 
14 Application no 23016/04 (ECHR 31 July 2012) Grand Chamber. 
15 Application nos 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 
16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90 (ECHR 18 September 2009) Grand Chamber. 
16 Application no 65840/09 and 66274/09 2009 (ECHR 28 June 2011) ‘the minarets 
case’. 
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“The Government argued that, in the absence of any domestic 
proceedings, the application should be declared inadmissible for 
failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The ECtHR did not agree and 
held the application to be admissible since there was no evidence 
leading the Court to draw the conclusion that, the applicants conduct, 
had hindered the proper functioning of the Court.”17 
 
The interpretation of these two requirements has been well rehearsed by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The French government 
contended that the SAS case was an abuse of an individual application, and 
under Article 35(3)(a) made an application to the Court for a declaration of 
inadmissibility. Further, the French government described her application as 
containing:  
 
“...a totally disembodied argument, lodged on the very day the 
prohibition on concealing the face in public came into force by an 
applicant who ha[d] not been the subject of domestic proceedings and 
of whom nothing [was] known, except what she [had] seen fit to say 
about her religious opinions and about her uncertain way of 
expressing them in her behaviour.”18  
 
They also noted impliedly disapprovingly that further applications had 
also been made by the United Kingdom lawyers who were representing the 
applicant. Notwithstanding this criticism the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
concluded that her application amounted to an actio popularis, that is to say 
an action brought by a member of the public on a point of public order. The 
Court concluded that victim status is not the exclusive preserve of those 
whose rights have already been breached but as case law demonstrates may 
also include putative or potential victims.19  
 
THIN AND VEILED - THE COURTS REASONING 
 
On the side of the applicant, the Court accepted that the drafting of the 
French law may have “upset” some sections of the Muslim community and 
recognised as valid the concerns that the ban may give rise to Islamophobia 
but rejected the argument of the Government that the ban was necessary for 
                                                     
17 SAS (n 3) [59]. 
18 Ibid [62]. 
19 Ibid [53]. See Dudgeon v the United Kingdom Application no 7525/76 (22 October 
1981) Series A no 45, Court Plenary, Norris v Ireland  Application no 10581/83 (26 
October 1988) Series A no 142, Court Plenary, and and Modinos v Cyprus 
Application no 15070/89 (22 April 1993) Series A no 259. Court Chamber. 
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public security.20 The Court accepted that there had been, an “interference” 
with or a “limitation” of the exercise of the applicant’s rights protected by 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention21 and gave what it described as a “detailed 
examination” of whether the aim was legitimate.22 In considering this the 
Court took into account the arguments concerning the need to see the face in 
social interaction and said this:  
 
“The Court is therefore able to accept that the barrier raised against 
others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent 
State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of 
socialisation which makes living together easier. That being said, in 
view of the flexibility of the notion of ‘living together’ and the 
resulting risk of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful 
examination of the necessity of the impugned limitation.”23  
 
When considering the obligation of furthering the objective of “living 
together” it said this: 
 
“Consequently, having regard in particular to the breadth of the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State in the present 
case, the Court finds that the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 
2010 can be regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the 
preservation of the conditions of ‘living together’ as an element of the 
‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’”24 
 
However, at the same time the Court said that “Pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness are hallmarks of a ‘democratic society’”25! Partly dissenting 
opinion was offered by Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom who both doubted 
whether the ban pursued a legitimate aim, and declared it unnecessary in a 
democratic society, arguing that the alleged fears about the burqa were created 
by the philosophy attaching to dress codes and its symbolic meaning.26 They 
said:  
 
                                                     
20 SAS [148], [149] and [139] respectively. 
21 Ibid [110]. 
22 Ibid [114]. 
23 Ibid [122]. 
24 Ibid [157]. 
25 Ibid [128]. 
26 Ibid [6]. 
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“Nevertheless, we cannot share the opinion of the majority as, in our 
view, it sacrifices concrete individual rights guaranteed by the 
Convention to abstract principles. It is doubtful that the blanket ban on 
wearing a full-face veil in public pursues a legitimate aim (B). In any 
event, such a far-reaching prohibition, touching upon the right to one’s 
own cultural and religious identity, is not necessary in a democratic 
society (C). Therefore we come to the conclusion that there has been a 
violation of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention (D).”27 
 
COMMENTARY 
 
This of course may be the first case where the question of criminalisation of 
the burqa has come before the ECtHR, but domestic case law across several 
jurisdictions has frequently considered whether the burqa may be worn by 
school pupils,28 or teachers29 and more recently whether the burqa may be 
worn in court,30 as well as women fleeing from the imposition of the burqa31 
and also those fleeing to the United Kingdom so they may wear the burqa.32 
 
Tolerance and shock in dissent 
 
Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom asserted that even if the French 
governments interpretation of the burqa was correct “...there is no right not to 
be shocked or provoked by different models of cultural or religious identity, 
even those that are very distant from the traditional French and European life-
style”33 since, as the Court has previously conceded, the Convention protects 
not only those opinions “that are favourably received or regarded as 
                                                     
27 Ibid [A2]. 
28 See X v Y School [2007] EWHC 298 (Admin), [2008] 1 All ER 249. 
29 Azmi (Appellant) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council (respondent) [2007] 
IRLR 484. 
30 In Canada see R v NS [2012] SCC 72 (CanLII), in the United Kingdom see  
R v D (R) [2013] Eq. L.R. 1034, [2014] 1 LRC 629. See also AAN (Veil) 
[2014] UKUT 00102 (IAC). See also commentaries on these cases for example, 
Susan Edwards, ‘Proscribing Unveiling: Law - a Chimera and an Instrument in the 
Political Agenda’ in Eva Brems (ed), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in 
Europe and the Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 278-297. 
31 R (On the Application of Shakeel) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2012] EWHC 1169 (A), CO/4528/2010. 
32 R (on the application of Baradaran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 24 June 2014 [2014] EWCA Civ 854; (2014) 164 
(7613) NLJ 18; Times, July 15, 2014. 
33 SAS [B7]. 
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inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also ... those that offend, shock 
or disturb” (see Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland [GC],34 and Stoll v 
Switzerland [GC]).35 In this sense the dissentient judgments return us to the 
Court in Handyside v the United Kingdom36 which held that information and 
ideas which “offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population” must be allowed to circulate in order to safeguard the “pluralism, 
tolerance and broad-mindedness without which there is no democratic 
society.” Furthermore, elsewhere the Court has held:  
 
“Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to 
those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of 
a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which 
ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any 
abuse of a dominant position.”37  
 
However the spirit of tolerance, pluralism and promotion of multi-culturalism 
did not result in the Court’s refusal to uphold the ban. In an anti-pluralist 
stance the burqa ban has sought to eradicate a source of tension or difference 
within French society. The French ban and the opinion of the ECtHR sends 
out the message that matters of interest and habit that may characterise a 
minority, where disapproved of by the majority, will in fact not be tolerated 
but simply eradicated and erased and extinguished. 
 
Proscribing “Living together” 
 
The central precept in the French government’s reasoning was at least for 
the Court a new concept of “living together”. Surprisingly, neither the French 
government nor the Court really had much to say on this concept albeit that it 
became the guiding justification for the ban. Certainly the Court spent much 
time reviewing other arguments and justifications for previous Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in which the Court had upheld state bans on religious dress, but 
such discussions lent nothing to clarifying the central justificatory concept of 
“living together.” It did however assist in examining how the margin of 
appreciation had been applied in such cases.  
 
“However, for their part, the Government indicated that it was a 
question of responding to a practice that the State deemed 
                                                     
34 Application no 16354/06 (ECHR, 13 July 2012) 48. 
35 Application no 69698/01 (ECHR, 10 December 2007) 101. 
36 Application no 5493/72 (7 December 1976) Series A no 24, 49. 
37 Young, James and Webster v the United Kingdom Application no 7601/76, 7806/77 
(13 August 1981) 63. 
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incompatible, in French society, with the ground rules of social 
communication and more broadly the requirements of ‘living 
together’. From that perspective, the respondent State is seeking to 
protect a principle of interaction between individuals, which in its 
view is essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but also of 
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic 
society (see paragraph 128 above). It can thus be said that the question 
whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in 
public places constitutes a choice of society.”38 
 
The concept of “living together” finds a place in a document published by 
the Council of Europe on the media39 but not in the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
The new concept of “living together” whatever this means is insufficiently 
defined thus permitting an extremely wide interpretation.  
If the French government accorded such a central place to banning the 
burqa in the pursuance of the objective of “living together” the reality on the 
ground is in fact the reverse across Europe where whilst some very different 
communities do indeed live together, many prefer to live apart. Looking to the 
experience of the United Kingdom as an example, it is certainly true that a 
diversity of groups are now practising and declaring their faith in a way that 
would simply not have been possible in the United Kingdom’s avowedly 
Christian country of the 1970’s. Mirza. Senthilkumaran and Ja’far in research 
published by the Policy Exchange found that many British born Muslims in a 
search for community and identity are turning to Islam.40 In London’s 
Southall 83% of the community are ethnic minorities largely originating from 
the Asian Subcontinent.41 Elsewhere, the Haredi Jewish Community of 
Stamford Hill in North London (Haredi means “fearful,”) are in fact 90% of 
the community. In furtherance of their Haredic faith in 2003 the local council 
permitted an “eruv” - which is a symbolic enclosure or symbolic walled city 
within which religious observances must be kept. It has a boundary 11 miles 
long and encloses an area of 6.5 square miles covering Hendon, Golders 
Green and Hampstead Garden Suburb, together with parts of Child’s Hill, 
Cricklewood, East Finchley, Finchley and Mill Hill. Clearly some 
communities prefer to live apart and practice their faith within their 
                                                     
38 SAS (n 3) [153].  
39 See Living Together, Yasha Lange (ed), (Council of Europe, April 2009) 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/livingtogether_en.pdf>. 
40 Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran and Zein Ja’far, Living Apart Together: British 
Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism, (Policy Exchange 2007). 
41 See <http://www.visitsouthall.co.uk/Local_Info/southall_middlesex.php>. 
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communities. Bikhu Parekh42 observes that if some cultures wish to live 
within their own communities we should respect them for that. And the 
dissenting judgments in SAS echo this: “Furthermore, it can hardly be argued 
that an individual has a right to enter into contact with other people, in public 
places, against their will. While communication is admittedly essential for life 
in society, the right to respect for private life also comprises the right not to 
communicate and not to enter into contact with others in public places – the 
right to be an outsider.”43 
 
France - a land of intolerance 
 
Parekh argues that at the heart of multi-cultural society lies the 
requirement of tolerance.44 Therefore we should tolerate living together in 
diversity and also living apart. Over the past three years we have witnessed 
European leaders expressing a view that prioritises the host state above those 
of minorities.45 Where is tolerance then in the decision of the Court or indeed 
in French society and government policy? In the language of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the opening clause of its preamble, upholds 
and affirms human dignity: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Article 1 recognises 
that, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” It also 
states that “8....tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings 
constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society” (see Gündüz v 
Turkey).46Tolerance however is something that French society has decided to 
set aside in favour of an enforced “living together” but in accordance with the 
dominant norms of French society. This enforced “living together” is nuanced 
in such a way that there are disturbing echoes of France’s colonialist past 
where the forcible unveiling of Algerian women in a claim to liberate them at 
the same time allowed the ulterior motive of domination and conquer to 
burgeon. Again the assault on the Arab female body is more about alterity cast 
in a paternalistic benevolent feigned motive and desire to live together, when 
the reality is to enforce the subaltern under and beneath.  
                                                     
42 Bikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political 
Theory (Harvard University Press, 2000). 
43 SAS n 3 [8]. 
44 Parekh  n 42 168. 
45 Rimvydas Ragauskas, 'Paradox of Multiculturalism: Tolerance for the Intolerant?' 
(GeoPolitika, 10 September 2012) accessed on <http://eurodialogue.eu/Paradox-Of-
Multiculturalism-Tolerance-For-The-Intolerant>. 
46 Application no 35071/97 (14 June 2004) 40. 
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The French path to this “living together” has been one of cultural 
genocide where anxiety about “the other” has resulted in oppression, 
domination and enforced assimilation. The history of France’s treatment of 
“the other” has been marked by intolerance. As far back as 1925, Les Cahiers 
du Mois sent out a questionnaire to its readership in which it explored, with 
over a 100 questions, its perceptions of “the Orient”, including questions 
which addressed the concern that the Orient was a dangerous place.47 The 
Court was eager to be seen to promoting harmony.  
 
“The Court reiterates that remarks which constitute a general, 
vehement attack on a religious or ethnic group are incompatible with 
the values of tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination which 
underlie the Convention and do not fall within the right to freedom of 
expression that it protects (see, among other authorities, Norwood v 
the United Kingdom (dec), no 23131/03, ECHR 2004-XI, and Ivanov 
v Russia (dec), no 35222/04, 20 February 2007).”48 
 
Fuelling intolerance 
 
So what about the arguments advanced by four of the interveners that the 
ban would actually increase the problem of Islamophobia and what about the 
Courts acceptance that this would indeed be the effect of such a ban? Clearly 
the decision reflects the assimilationist thrust of France. Parekh argues that 
societies and cultures are also moral systems and society needs to show that 
diversity whatever that may be, provided it does not harm others, is justified 
and to be defended.49 Indeed, there is much evidence that hate crimes against 
women wearing burqas are becoming increasingly prevalent. It was also 
emphasised by the Court “that a State which enters into a legislative process 
of this kind takes the risk of contributing to the promulgation of stereotypes 
and intolerance, when it has a duty, to promote tolerance.”50 
Certainly data from the Criminal Statistics England and Wales for 
2011/12 and 2012/13,51 estimated an average of 70,000 incidents of 
                                                     
47 Nathaniel Berman, ‘The Appeals of the Orient: Colonized Desire and the War of 
the Riff' in Karen Knop (ed), Gender and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2004) 194. 
48 SAS n 3 [149]. 
49 Parekh (n 42) 166. 
50 SAS n 3 [149]. 
51 See An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales (Home Office, Office for 
National Statistics and Ministry of Justice December 2013)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file 
/266358/hate-crime-2013.pdf> accessed 12 August 2014. 
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religiously motivated hate crime annually52 with Muslim adults the most 
likely to be a victim of religiously motivated hate crime.53 In 2012/13, the 
police recorded 1,573 religious hate crimes, around one-quarter (24%) of 
religious hate crimes were recorded by the police as violence against the 
person and of these violent crimes, 64 per cent involved injury.54  
 
Refugees fleeing from intolerance 
 
France will become an increasingly inhospitable place for women who wish 
to wear the burqa. Already applications have been made by women for 
sanctuary in the UK fleeing France because of the criminalisation of those 
should they wear the burqa. In B and M v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,55 the father and daughter were Iranian nationals and practising 
Muslims, they arrived in France claiming asylum and later entered the United 
Kingdom. The question for the Court was whether they should be returned to 
France as the first country of arrival. They contended that they could not 
return to France because of the burqa ban already in force. The Secretary of 
State responded by refusing the third country claim. B and M appealed on the 
basis that the decision to remove them to France violated their rights under art 
8 and art 9 with art 14 of the Convention so that the decision was unlawful, 
and was made in breach of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 
2009 s 55.They also argued a violation of art 3. The Court of Appeal in R (on 
the application of Baradaran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department56 
held that there claim under Articles 8, 9 and 14 of the Convention failed since 
the applicant would be permitted to wear her burqa at home and at places of 
worship.  
The ECtHR in SAS has expressed some anxiety about the French 
prohibition since such a prohibition creates a climate of exclusion. Indeed, 
this state sponsored justification for stigmatisation and exclusion permitted by 
a wide margin of appreciation troubled the Court who recognise the damage 
that will be done to community relations and ask what mechanisms will be put 
in place to address the fallout from this ruling. 
 
“In this connection, the Court is very concerned by the indications of 
some of the third-party interveners to the effect that certain 
Islamophobia remarks marked the debate which preceded the adoption 
of the Law of 11 October 2010 (see the observations of the Human 
                                                     
52 Ibid Appendix Table 1.01. 
53 Ibid Appendix Table 1.14. 
54 Ibid, Figure 4; Appendix Table 2.03. 
55 [2013] EWHC 2281 (Admin). 
56 R (on the application of Baradaran) (n 32). 
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Rights Centre of Ghent University and of the non-governmental 
organisations Liberty and Open Society Justice Initiative, paragraphs 
98, 100 and 104 above). It is admittedly not for the Court to rule on 
whether legislation is desirable in such matters. ...”57 
 
Notwithstanding their concern, the enormously wide margin of 
appreciation in this case results in a somewhat troubled ECtHR upholding the 
ban. France must simply be urged to put in place strategies to prevent the 
explosion in hate crime that will inevitably follow.58 
                                                     
57 SAS (n 3) [1]. 
58 See the evidence of hate crime related to dress, ‘“Maybe we are Hated”: The 
Experience and Impact of Anti-Muslim Hate on British Muslim Women’ (University 
of Birmingham 2013) which found that of hate crimes reported 58% were against 
women and of those 83% were against women wearing a niqab or hijab. See also 
Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, ‘Islamophobia: A Challenge for 
us all’ (The Runnymede Trust 1997). 
